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Abstract
Detection of some types of toxic language is
hampered by extreme scarcity of labeled train-
ing data. Data augmentation – generating new
synthetic data from a labeled seed dataset –
can help. The efficacy of data augmentation on
toxic language classification has not been fully
explored. We present the first systematic study
on how data augmentation techniques impact
performance across toxic language classifiers,
ranging from shallow logistic regression ar-
chitectures to BERT – a state-of-the-art pre-
trained Transformer network. We compare
the performance of eight techniques on very
scarce seed datasets. We show that while
BERT performed the best, shallow classifiers
performed comparably when trained on data
augmented with a combination of three tech-
niques, including GPT-2-generated sentences.
We discuss the interplay of performance and
computational overhead, which can inform
the choice of techniques under different con-
straints.
1 Introduction
Toxic language is an increasingly urgent chal-
lenge in online communities (Mathew et al.,
2019). Although there are several datasets,
most commonly from Twitter or forum dis-
cussions (Badjatiya et al., 2017; Davidson et al.,
2017; Waseem and Hovy, 2016; Wulczyn et al.,
2017; Zhang et al., 2018), high class imbalance is
a problem with certain classes of toxic language
(Breitfeller et al., 2019). Manual labeling of toxic
content is onerous, hazardous (Newton, 2020), and
thus expensive.
One strategy for mitigating these problems
is data augmentation (Wang and Yang, 2015;
Ratner et al., 2017; Wei and Zou, 2019): comple-
menting the manually labeled seed data with new
∗This work was done during a postdoctoral fellowship at
University of Waterloo, Canada.
synthetic documents. The effectiveness of data
augmentation for toxic language classification has
not yet been thoroughly explored. On relatively
small toxic language datasets, shallow classifiers
have been shown to perform well (Gro¨ndahl et al.,
2018). At the same time, pre-trained Transformer
networks (Vaswani et al., 2017) have led to im-
pressive results in several NLP tasks (Young et al.,
2018). Comparing the effects of data augmenta-
tion between shallow classifiers and pre-trained
Transformers is thus of particular interest.
We systematically compared eight augmen-
tation techniques on four classifiers, ranging
from shallow architectures to BERT (Devlin et al.,
2019), a popular pre-trained Transformer network.
We used downsampled variants of the Kaggle
Toxic Comment Classification Challenge dataset
(Jigsaw 2018; §3) as our seed dataset. We focused
on the threat class in this dataset, but our results
are likely to hold for other types of toxic language
as well (§4.7). With some classifiers, we reached
the same F1-score as when training on the origi-
nal dataset, which is 20x larger. However, perfor-
mance improvement varied significantly between
classifiers.
We obtained the highest overall results with
BERT, increasing the F1-score up to 21% com-
pared to training on seed data alone. How-
ever, augmentation using a fine-tuned GPT-2
(§3.2.4) – a pre-trained Transformer language
model (Radford et al., 2019) – reached almost
BERT-level performance even with shallow clas-
sifiers. Combining multiple augmentation tech-
niques, such as adding majority class sentences
to minority class documents (§3.2.3) and re-
placing subwords with embedding-space neigh-
bors (Heinzerling and Strube, 2018) (§3.2.2) im-
proved performance on all classifiers. We discuss
the interplay of performance and computational re-
quirements like memory and run-time costs (§4.6).
2 Preliminaries
Data augmentation arises naturally from
the problem of filling in missing val-
ues (Tanner and Wong, 1987). In classifica-
tion, data augmentation is applied to available
training data. Classifier performance is mea-
sured on a separate (non-augmented) test
set (Krizhevsky et al., 2012). Data augmen-
tation can decrease overfitting (Wong et al.,
2016; Shorten and Khoshgoftaar, 2019); and
broaden the input feature range by increasing the
vocabulary (Fadaee et al., 2019).
Simple oversampling is the most basic augmenta-
tion technique: copying minority class datapoints
to appear multiple times. This increases the rele-
vance of minority class features for computing the
loss during training (Chawla et al., 2002).
EDA is a prior technique combining four text
transformations to improve classification with
CNN and RNN architectures (Wei and Zou, 2019).
It uses (i) synonym replacement from WordNet
(§3.2.1), (ii) random insertion of a synonym, (iii)
random swap of two words, and (iv) random word
deletion.
Word replacement has been applied in sev-
eral data augmentation studies (Zhang et al.,
2015; Wang and Yang, 2015; Xie et al., 2017;
Wei and Zou, 2019; Fadaee et al., 2019). We com-
pared four techniques, two based on semantic
knowledge bases (§3.2.1) and two on pre-trained
(sub)word embeddings (§3.2.2).
Pre-trained Transformer networks feature
prominently in state-of-the-art NLP research.
They are able to learn contextual embed-
dings, which depend on neighboring sub-
words (Devlin et al., 2019). Fine-tuning – adapt-
ing the weights of a pre-trained Transformer to a
specific corpus – has been highly effective in im-
proving classification performance (Devlin et al.,
2019), and language modeling (Radford et al.,
2019; Walton; Branwen, 2019). State-of-the-art
networks are trained on large corpora: GPT-2’s
corpus contains 8M web pages, while BERT’s
training corpus contains 3.3B words.
3 Methodology
We now describe the data (3.1), augmentation tech-
niques (3.2), and classifiers (3.3) we used.
3.1 Dataset
We used Kaggle’s toxic comment classification
challenge dataset (Jigsaw, 2018). It contains
human-labeled English Wikipedia comments in
six different classes of toxic language.1 The me-
dian length of a document is three sentences, but
the distribution is heavy-tailed (Table 1).
Mean Std. Min Max 25% 50% 75%
4 6 1 683 2 3 5
Table 1: Document lengths (number of sentences; tok-
enized with NLTK sent tokenize (Bird et al., 2009)).
Some classes are severely under-represented:
e.g., 478 examples of threat vs. 159093 non-
threat examples. Our experiments concern bi-
nary classification, where one class is the minor-
ity class and all remaining documents belong to
the majority class. We focus on threat as the
minority class, as it poses the most challenge for
automated analysis in this dataset (van Aken et al.,
2018). To confirm our results, we also applied
the best-performing techniques on a different type
of toxic language, the identity-hate class
(§4.7).
Our goal is to understand how data augmen-
tation improves performance under extreme data
scarcity in the minority class (threat). To simu-
late this, we derive our seed dataset (SEED) from
the full data set (GOLD STANDARD) via stratified
bootstrap sampling (Bickel and Freedman, 1984)
to reduce the dataset size k-fold. We replaced new-
lines, tabs and repeated spaces with single spaces,
and lowercased each dataset. We applied data aug-
mentation techniques on SEED with k-fold over-
sampling of the minority class, and compared
each classifier architecture (§3.3) trained on SEED,
GOLD STANDARD, and the augmented datasets.
We used the original test dataset (TEST) for eval-
uating performance. We detail the dataset sizes in
Table 2.
GOLD STD. SEED TEST
Minority 478 25 211
Majority 159,093 7955 63,767
Table 2: Number of documents (minority: threat)
Ethical considerations. We used only public
1Although one class is specifically called toxic, all six
represent types of toxic language. See Appendix A.
datasets, and did not involve human subjects.
3.2 Data augmentation techniques
We evaluated six data augmentation techniques on
four classifiers (Table 3). We describe each aug-
mentation technique (below) and classifier (§3.3).
For comparison, we also evaluated simple over-
sampling (COPY) and EDA (Wei and Zou, 2019),
both reviewed in §2. Following the recommen-
dation of Wei and Zou (2019) for applying EDA
to small seed datasets, we used 5% augmentation
probability, whereby each word has a 1− 0.954 ≈
19% probability of being transformed by at least
one of the four EDA techniques.
Four of the six techniques are based on replac-
ing words with semantically close counterparts;
two using semantic knowledge bases (§3.2.1) and
two pre-trained embeddings (§3.2.2). We applied
25% of all possible replacements with these tech-
niques, which is close to the recommended substi-
tution rate in EDA. For short documents we en-
sured that at least one substitution is always se-
lected. We also added majority class material to
minority class documents (§3.2.3), and generated
text with the GPT-2 language model fine-tuned
on SEED (§3.2.4).
3.2.1 Substitutions from a knowledge base
WordNet is a semantic knowledge base contain-
ing various properties of word senses, which cor-
respond to word meanings (Miller, 1995). We
augmented SEED by replacing words with random
synonyms. While EDA also uses WordNet syn-
onyms (§2), we additionally applied word sense
disambiguation (Navigli, 2009) and inflection.
For word sense disambiguation we used simple
Lesk from PyWSD (Tan, 2014). As a variant of
the Lesk algorithm (Lesk, 1986) it relies on over-
lap in definitions and example sentences (both pro-
vided in WordNet), compared between each candi-
date sense and words in the context.
Word senses appear as uninflected lemmas,
which we inflected using a dictionary-based tech-
nique. We lemmatized and annotated a large cor-
pus with NLTK (Bird et al., 2009), and mapped
each <lemma, tag> combination to its most com-
mon surface form. The corpus contains 8.5million
short sentences (≤ 20 words) from multiple open-
source corpora (see Appendix E). We designed it
to have both a large vocabulary for wide coverage
(371125 lemmas), and grammatically simple sen-
tences to maximize correct tagging.
Paraphrase Database (PPDB) was collected
from bilingual parallel corpora on the premise
that English phrases translated identically
to another language tend to be paraphrases
(Ganitkevitch et al., 2013; Pavlick et al., 2015).
We used phrase pairs tagged as equivalent,
constituting 245691 paraphrases altogether. We
controlled substitution by grammatical context as
specified in PPDB. In single words this is the part-
of-speech tag; whereas in multi-word paraphrases
it also contains the syntactic category that appears
after the original phrase in the PPDB training
corpus. We obtained grammatical information
with the Spacy2 parser.
3.2.2 Embedding neighbour substitutions
Embeddings can be used to map units to others
with a similar occurrence distribution in a training
corpus (Mikolov et al., 2013). We considered two
alternative pre-trained embedding models. For
each model, we produced top-10 nearest embed-
ding neighbours (cosine similarity) of each word
selected for replacement, and randomly picked the
new word from these.
Twitter word embeddings (GLOVE)
(Pennington et al., 2014) were obtained from
a Twitter corpus,3 and we deployed these via
Gensim (Rˇehu˚rˇek and Sojka, 2010).
Subword embeddings (BPEMB) have emerged
as a practical pre-processing tool for overcom-
ing the challenge of low-prevalence words
(Sennrich et al., 2016). They have been applied
in Transformer algorithms, including Word-
Piece (Wu et al., 2016) for BERT (Devlin et al.,
2019), and BPE (Sennrich et al., 2016)
for GPT-2 (Radford et al., 2019).
BPEMB (Heinzerling and Strube, 2018) provides
pre-trained GloVe embeddings, constructed by
applying SentencePiece (Kudo and Richardson,
2018) on the English Wikipedia. We use
50-dimensional BPEMB-embeddings with
vocabulary size 10,000.
3.2.3 Majority class sentence addition (ADD)
Adding unrelated material to the training data can
be beneficial by making relevant features stand
out (Wong et al., 2016; Shorten and Khoshgoftaar,
2019). We added a random sentence from a ma-
jority class document in SEED to a random posi-
2https://spacy.io/
3We use 25-dimensional GloVe-embeddings from:
https://nlp.stanford.edu/projects/glove/
Augmentation Type Unit #Parameters Pre-training Corpus
ADD Non-toxic corpus Sentence NA NA
PPDB Knowledge Base N-gram NA NA
WORDNET Knowledge Base Word NA NA
GLOVE GloVe Word 30M Twitter
BPEMB GloVe Subword 0.5M Wikipedia
GPT-2 Transformer Subword 117M WebText
Classifier Model Type Unit #Parameters Pre-training Corpus
Char-LR Logistic regression Character 30K -
Word-LR Logistic regression Word 30K -
CNN Convolutional network Word 3M -
BERT Transformer Subword 110M Wikipedia & BookCorpus
Table 3: Augmentation techniques and classifiers considered in this study.
tion in a copy of each minority class training doc-
ument.
3.2.4 GPT-2 conditional generation
GPT-2 is a Transformer language model pre-
trained on a large collection of Web docu-
ments. We used the 110M parameter GPT-2
model from the Transformers library (Wolf et al.,
2019) We discuss parameters in Appendix F.
We augmented as follows (N -fold oversam-
pling):
1. Gˆ ← briefly train GPT-2 on minority class
documents in SEED.
2. generate N − 1 novel documents xˆ← Gˆ(x)
for all minority class samples x in SEED.
3. assign the minority class label to all docu-
ments xˆ
4. merge xˆ with SEED.
3.3 Classifiers
Char-LR and Word-LR. We adapted the logistic
regression pipeline from the Wiki-detox project
(Wulczyn et al., 2017).4 We allowed n-grams in
the range 1–4, and kept the default parameters:
TF-IDF normalization, vocabulary size at 10, 000
and parameter C = 10 (inverse regularization
strength).
CNN. We applied a word-based CNN model with
10 kernels of sizes 3, 4 and 5. Vocabulary size was
10, 000 and embedding dimensionality 300. For
training, we used the dropout probability of 0.1,
and the Adam optimizer (Kingma and Ba, 2014)
with the learning rate of 0.001.
BERT. We used the pre-trained Uncased BERT-
Base and trained the model with the training script
4
https://github.com/ewulczyn/wiki-detox/blob/master/src/modeling/get_prod_models.py
from Fast-Bert.5 We set maximum sequence
length to 128 and mixed precision optimization
level to O1.
4 Results
4.1 Evaluation
We compared precision and recall for the minor-
ity class (threat), and the macro-averaged F1-
score for each classifier and augmentation tech-
nique. (For brevity, we use “F1-score” from now
on.) The majority class F1-score remained 1.00
(two digit rounding) across all our experiments.
All classifiers are binary, and we assigned predic-
tions to the class that attained the highest condi-
tional probability. We relax this assumption in
§4.5, to report area under the curve (AUC) val-
ues (Murphy, 2012).
To validate our results, we performed repeated
experiments with the common random numbers
technique (Glasserman and Yao, 1992), by which
we controlled the sampling of SEED, initial ran-
dom weights of classifiers, and the optimization
procedure. We repeated the expeiments 30 times,
and report confidence intervals.
4.2 Results without augmentation
We first show classifier performance on
GOLD STANDARD and SEED in Table 4.
van Aken et al. (2018) reported F1-scores for
logistic regression and CNN classifiers on GOLD
STANDARD. Our results are comparable. We
also evaluate BERT, which is noticeably better
on GOLD STANDARD, particularly in terms of
threat recall.
5
https://github.com/kaushaltrivedi/fast-bert/blob/master/sample_notebooks/new-toxic-multilabel.ipynb
GOLD STANDARD
Char-LR Word-LR CNN BERT
Precision 0.61 0.43 0.60 0.54
Recall 0.34 0.36 0.33 0.54
F1 0.72 0.69 0.71 0.77
SEED
Char-LR Word-LR CNN BERT
Precision 0.64 0.47 0.41 0.00
Recall 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.00
F1 0.52 0.53 0.57 0.50
Table 4: Classifier performance on GOLD STAN-
DARD and SEED. Precision and recall for threat;
F1-score macro-averaged from both classes.
All classifiers had significantly reduced F1-
scores on SEED, due to major drops in threat re-
call. In particular, BERT was degenerate, assigning
all documents to the majority class in all 30 repe-
titions. Devlin et al. (2019) report that such be-
havior may occur on small datasets, but random
restarts may help. In our case, random restarts did
not impact BERT performance on SEED.
4.3 Augmentations
SEED Augmented
Minority 25 25→500
Majority 7955 7955
Table 5: Number of documents in augmented datasets.
We retained original SEED documents and expanded
the dataset with additional synthetic documents (minor-
ity: threat)
We applied all eight augmentation tech-
niques (§3.2) to the minority class of SEED
(threat). Each technique retains one copy of
each SEED document, and adds 19 synthetically
generated documents per SEED document. Ta-
ble 5 summarizes augmented dataset sizes. We
present our main results in Table 6. We first
discuss classifier-specific observations, and then
make general observations on each augmentation
technique.
We compared the impact of augmentations on
each classifier, and therefore our performance
comparisons below are local to each column (i.e.,
classifier). We identify the best performing tech-
nique for the three metrics and report the p-value
when its effect is significantly better than the other
techniques (based on one-sided paired t-tests, α =
5%).6
BERT. COPY and ADD were successful on BERT,
raising the F1-score up to 21 percentage points
above SEED to 0.71. But their impacts on BERT
were different: ADD led to increased recall, while
COPY resulted in increased precision. PPDB pre-
cision and recall were statistically indistinguish-
able from COPY, which indicates that it did few
alterations. GPT-2 led to significantly better re-
call (p < 10−5 for all pairings), even surpass-
ing GOLD STANDARD. Word substitution meth-
ods like EDA, WORDNET, GLOVE, and BPEMB
improved on SEED, but were less effective than
COPY in both precision and recall. Park et al.
(2019) found that BERT may perform poorly on
out-of-domain samples. BERT is reportedly un-
stable on adversarially chosen subword substitu-
tions (Sun et al., 2020). We suggest that non-
contextual word embedding schemes may be sub-
optimal for BERT since its pre-training is not con-
ducted with similarly noisy documents. We veri-
fied that reducing the number of replaced words
was indeed beneficial for BERT (Appendix G).
Char-LR. BPEMB and ADD were effective at in-
creasing recall, and reached similar increases in
F1-score. GPT-2 raised recall to GOLD STAN-
DARD level (p < 10−5 for all pairings), but preci-
sion remained 16 percentage points below GOLD
STANDARD. It led to the best increase in F1-score:
16 percentage points above SEED (p < 10−3 for
all pairings).
Word-LR. Embedding-based BPEMB and GLOVE
increased recall by at least 13 percentage points,
but the conceptually similar PPDB and WORD-
NET were largely unsuccessful. We suggest
this discrepancy may be due to WORDNET and
PPDB relying on written standard English,
whereas toxic language tends to be more collo-
quial. GPT-2 increased recall and F1-score the
most: 15 percentage points above SEED (p <
10−10 for all pairings).
CNN. GLOVE and ADD increased recall by at least
10 percentage points. BPEMB led to a large in-
crease in recall, but with a drop in precision, pos-
sibly due to its larger capacity to make changes in
text – GLOVE can only replace entire words that
exist in the pre-training corpus. GPT-2 yielded the
largest increases in recall and F1-score (p < 10−4
for all pairings).
6The statistical significance results apply to this dataset,
but are indicative of the behavior of the techniques in general.
Augmentation Metric Char-LR Word-LR CNN BERT
SEED
No Oversampling
Precision 0.68± 0.22 0.43± 0.27 0.45± 0.14 0.00 ± 0.00
Recall 0.03 ± 0.02 0.04 ± 0.02 0.08 ± 0.05 0.00 ± 0.00
F1 (macro) 0.53 ± 0.02 0.54 ± 0.02 0.56 ± 0.03 0.50 ± 0.00
COPY
Simple Oversampling
Precision 0.67± 0.07 0.38± 0.24 0.40 ± 0.08 0.49± 0.07
Recall 0.16 ± 0.03 0.03 ± 0.02 0.07 ± 0.03 0.36 ± 0.09
F1 (macro) 0.63 ± 0.02 0.53 ± 0.02 0.56 ± 0.02 0.70± 0.03
EDA
Wei and Zou (2019)
Precision 0.66± 0.06 0.36 ± 0.19 0.26 ± 0.09 0.21 ± 0.03
Recall 0.13 ± 0.03 0.08 ± 0.04 0.07 ± 0.01 0.06 ± 0.01
F1 (macro) 0.61 ± 0.02 0.56 ± 0.03 0.55 ± 0.01 0.54 ± 0.01
ADD
Add Majority-class Sentence
Precision 0.58 ± 0.07 0.36 ± 0.21 0.45± 0.07 0.36 ± 0.04
Recall 0.24 ± 0.04 0.06 ± 0.04 0.19 ± 0.07 0.52 ± 0.07
F1 (macro) 0.67 ± 0.03 0.55 ± 0.03 0.63 ± 0.04 0.71± 0.01
PPDB
Phrase Substitutions
Precision 0.16 ± 0.08 0.41± 0.27 0.37 ± 0.09 0.48± 0.06
Recall 0.10 ± 0.03 0.04 ± 0.02 0.08 ± 0.04 0.34 ± 0.08
F1 (macro) 0.56 ± 0.02 0.53 ± 0.02 0.57 ± 0.02 0.70 ± 0.03
WORDNET
Word Substitutions
Precision 0.16 ± 0.06 0.36 ± 0.24 0.41± 0.08 0.47 ± 0.08
Recall 0.11 ± 0.03 0.05 ± 0.03 0.11 ± 0.05 0.29 ± 0.07
F1 (macro) 0.56 ± 0.02 0.54 ± 0.02 0.58 ± 0.03 0.68 ± 0.03
GLOVE
Word Substitutions
Precision 0.15 ± 0.04 0.39± 0.12 0.38 ± 0.08 0.43 ± 0.11
Recall 0.14 ± 0.03 0.16 ± 0.05 0.18 ± 0.06 0.18 ± 0.06
F1 (macro) 0.57 ± 0.02 0.61 ± 0.03 0.62 ± 0.03 0.62 ± 0.03
BPEMB
Subword Substitutions
Precision 0.56 ± 0.07 0.33 ± 0.07 0.25 ± 0.07 0.38 ± 0.12
Recall 0.22 ± 0.03 0.22 ± 0.04 0.37 ± 0.08 0.16 ± 0.04
F1 (macro) 0.66 ± 0.02 0.63 ± 0.02 0.64 ± 0.03 0.61 ± 0.03
GPT-2
Conditional Generation
Precision 0.45 ± 0.08 0.35 ± 0.07 0.31 ± 0.08 0.15 ± 0.05
Recall 0.33± 0.04 0.42± 0.05 0.46± 0.10 0.62± 0.09
F1 (macro) 0.69± 0.02 0.69± 0.02 0.68± 0.02 0.62 ± 0.03
Table 6: Comparison of augmentation techniques for 20x augmentation on SEED/threat: Means for precision,
recall and macro-averaged F1-score shown with standard deviations (30 paired repetitions). Bold figures represent
techniques that are either best, or not significantly different (α = 5%) from this best technique. Double underlines
indicate the best technique (for a givenmetric and classifier) significantly better (α = 1%) than all other techniques.
We now discuss each augmentation technique.
COPY emphasizes the features of original minor-
ity documents in SEED, which generally resulted
in fairly high precision. On Word-LR, COPY is anal-
ogous to increasing the weight of words that ap-
pears in minority documents.
EDA behaved similarly to COPY on Char-LR,
Word-LR and CNN; but markedly worse on BERT.
ADD reduces the classifier’s sensitivity to irrele-
vant material by adding majority class sentences
to minority class documents. On Word-LR, ADD
is analogous to reducing the weights of majority
class words. ADD led to a marginally better F1-
score than any other technique on BERT.
Word replacement was more effective with
GLOVE and BPEMB than with PPDB or WORD-
NET. PPDB and WORDNET generally replace
few words per document, which often resulted in
similar performance to COPY. BPEMB was gener-
ally the most effective among these techniques.
GPT-2 had the best improvement overall, leading
to significant increases in recall across all classi-
fiers, and the highest F1-score on all but BERT.
The increase in recall can be attributed to GPT-2’s
capacity for introducing novel phrases. However,
there is a risk that human annotators might not la-
bel the generated documents as toxic. Such label
noisemay decrease precision. (See example in Ap-
pendix H, Table 22.)
4.4 Mixed augmentations
In §4.3 we saw that the effect of augmentations
differ across classifiers. A natural question is
whether it is beneficial to combine augmentation
techniques. For all classifiers except BERT, the
best performing techniques were GPT-2, ADD,
and BPEMB (Table 6). They also represent each
of our augmentation types (§4.3), BPEMB having
the highest performance among the four word re-
placement techniques (§3.2.1–§3.2.2) in these clas-
sifiers.
We combined the techniques by merging aug-
mented documents in equal proportions. In
ABG, we included documents generated by ADD,
BPEMB or GPT-2. Since ADD and BPEMB im-
pose significantly lower computational and mem-
ory requirements than GPT-2, and require no ac-
cess to a GPU (Appendix C), we also evaluated
combining only ADD and BPEMB (AB).
ABG outperformed all other techniques (in F1-
score) on Char-LR and CNN with statistical signifi-
cance, while being marginally better on Word-LR.
On BERT, ABG achieved a better F1-score and
precision than GPT-2 alone (p < 10−10), and a
better recall (p < 0.05). ABG was better than AB
in recall on Word-LR and CNN, while the precision
was comparable.
Augmenting with ABG resulted in similar per-
formance as GOLD STANDARD on Word-LR, Char-
LR and CNN (Table 4). Comparing Tables 6 and 7,
it is clear that much of the performance improve-
ment came from the increased vocabulary cover-
age of GPT-2-generated documents. Our results
suggest that in certain types of data like toxic lan-
guage, consistent labeling may be more important
than wide coverage in dataset collection, since au-
tomated data augmentation can increase the cov-
erage of language. Furthermore, Char-LR trained
with ABG was comparable (no statistically signif-
icant difference) to the best results obtained with
BERT (trained with COPY, p > 0.2 on all metrics).
4.5 Average classification performance
The results in Tables 6 and 7 focus on precision, re-
call and the F1-score of different models and aug-
mentation techniques where the probability thresh-
old for determining the positive or negative class
is 0.5. In general the level of precision and recall
are adapted based on the use case for the classifier.
Another general evaluation of a classifier is based
on the ROC-AUC metric, which is the area under
the curve for a plot of true-positive rate versus the
false-positive rate for a range of thresholds varying
over [0, 1]. Table 8 shows the ROC-AUC scores
for each of the classifiers for the best augmentation
AB
Char-LR Word-LR CNN BERT
Precision 0.56 0.37 0.33 0.41
Recall 0.26 0.18 0.36 0.36
F1 0.68 0.62 0.67 0.69
ABG
Char-LR Word-LR CNN BERT
Precision 0.48 0.37 0.31 0.28
Recall 0.36 0.39 0.52 0.65
F1 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.69
Table 7: Effects of mixed augmentation (20x) on
SEED/threat (Annotations as in Table 6). Precision
and recall for threat; F1-score macro-averaged from
both classes.
techniques from Tables 6 and 7. BERT with ABG
gave the best ROC-AUC value of 0.977 which
is significantly higher than BERT with any other
augmentation technique (p < 10−6). CNN exhib-
ited a similar pattern: ABG resulted in the best
ROC-AUC compared to the other augmentation
techniques (p < 10−6). For Word-LR, ROC-AUC
was highest for ABG, but the difference to GPT-2
was not statistically significant (p > 0.05). In the
case of Char-LR, none of the augmentation tech-
niques improved on SEED (p < 0.05). Char-LR
produced a more consistent averaged performance
across all augmentation methods with ROC-AUC
values varying between (0.958, 0.973), compared
to variations across all augmentation techniques
of (0.792, 0.962) and (0.816, 0.977) for CNN and
BERT respectively.
Our results highlight a difference to the results
in Tables 6 and 7: while COPY reached a high F1-
score on BERT, our results on ROC-AUC high-
light that such performance may not hold while
varying the decision threshold.
We observe that a combined augmentation
method such as ABG provides an increased abil-
ity to vary the decision threshold for the more
complex classifiers such as CNN and BERT. Sim-
pler models performed consistently across differ-
ent augmentation techniques.
4.6 Computational requirements
BERT has significant computational requirements
(Table 9). Deploying BERT on common EC2 in-
stances requires 13 GB GPU memory. ABG on
EC2 requires 4 GB GPU memory for approxi-
mately 100s (for 20x augmentation). All other
Char-LR Word-LR CNN BERT
SEED 0.973 0.968 0.922 0.816
COPY 0.972 0.937 0.792 0.898
ADD 0.958 0.955 0.904 0.956
BPEMB 0.968 0.968 0.940 0.868
GPT-2 0.969 0.973 0.953 0.964
ABG 0.972 0.973 0.962 0.977
Table 8: Comparison of ROC-AUC for augmentation
(20x) on SEED/threat (Annotations as in Table 6).
techniques take only a few seconds on ordinary
desktop computers (See Appendices C–D for ad-
ditional data on computational requirements).
ADD BPEMB GPT-2 ABG
CPU - 100 3,600 3,600
GPU - - 3,600 3,600
Char-LR Word-LR CNN BERT
CPU 100 100 400 13,000
GPU 100 100 400 13,000
Table 9: Memory (MB) required for augmentation tech-
niques and classifiers. Rounded to nearest 100 MB.
4.7 Alternative toxic class
In order to see whether our results described so
far generalize beyond threat, we repeated our
experiments using another toxic language class,
identity-hate, as the minority class. Our re-
sults for identity-hate are in line with those
for threat. All classifiers performed poorly on
SEED due to very low recall. Augmentation with
simple techniques helped BERT gain more than 20
percentage points for the F1-score. Shallow clas-
sifiers approached BERT-like performance with ap-
propriate augmentation. Due to space constraints,
we present further details in Appendix B.
5 Related work
Toxic language classification has been conducted
in a number of studies (Schmidt and Wiegand,
2017; Davidson et al., 2017; Wulczyn et al.,
2017; Gro¨ndahl et al., 2018; Qian et al., 2019;
Breitfeller et al., 2019). NLP applications
of data augmentation include text classifica-
tion (Ratner et al., 2017; Wei and Zou, 2019;
Mesbah et al., 2019), user behavior categorization
(Wang and Yang, 2015), dependency parsing
(Vania et al., 2019), and machine translation
(Fadaee et al., 2019; Xia et al., 2019). Related
techniques are also used in automatic paraphras-
ing (Madnani and Dorr, 2010; Li et al., 2018)
and writing style transfer (Shen et al., 2017;
Shetty et al., 2018; Mahmood et al., 2019).
Hu et al. (2017) produced text with controlled
target attributes via variational autoencoders.
Mesbah et al. (2019) generated artificial sentences
for adverse drug reactions using Reddit and Twit-
ter data. Similarly to their work, we generated
novel toxic sentences from a language model.
Petroni et al. (2019) compared several pre-trained
language models on their ability to understand fac-
tual and commonsense reasoning. BERT models
consistently outperformed other language models.
Petroni et al. suggest that large pre-trained lan-
guage models may become alternatives to knowl-
edge bases in the future.
6 Discussion and conclusions
Our results highlight the relationship between clas-
sification performance and computational over-
head. Overall, BERT performed the best with data
augmentation. However, it is highly resource-
intensive (§4.6). ABG yielded almost BERT-
level F1- and ROC-AUC scores on all classifiers.
While using GPT-2 is more expensive than other
augmentation techniques, it has significantly less
requirements than BERT. Additionally, augmenta-
tion is a one-time upfront cost in contrast to on-
going costs for classifiers. Thus, the trade-off be-
tween performance and computational resources
can influence which technique is most optimal in
a given setting.
We identify the following further topics that we
leave for future work.
SEED coverage. Our results show that data aug-
mentation can increase coverage, leading to better
toxic language classifiers when starting with very
small seed datasets. The effects of data augmenta-
tion will likely differ with larger seed datasets.
Languages. Some augmentation techniques are
limited in their applicability across languages.
GPT-2, WORDNET, PPDB and GLOVE are avail-
able for certain other languages, but with less cov-
erage than in English. BPEMB is nominally avail-
able in 275 languages, but has not been thoroughly
tested on less prominent languages.
Transformers. BERT has inspired work on other
pre-trained Transformer classifiers, leading to bet-
ter classification performance (Liu et al., 2019;
Lewis et al., 2019) and better trade-offs between
memory consumption and classification perfor-
mance (Sanh et al., 2019; Jiao et al., 2019). Ex-
ploring the effects of augmentation on these Trans-
former classifiers is left for future work.
Attacks. Training classifiers with augmented data
may influence their vulnerability for model extrac-
tion attacks (Trame`r et al., 2016; Krishna et al.),
model evasion (Gro¨ndahl et al., 2018) or back-
doors (Schuster et al., 2020). We leave such con-
siderations for future work.
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A Class overlap and interpretation of
“toxicity”
Kaggle’s toxic comment classification challenge
dataset (Jigsaw, 2018) contains six classes, one of
which is called toxic. But all six classes repre-
sent examples of toxic speech: toxic, severe
toxic, obscene, threat, insult, and
identity-hate. Of the threat docu-
ments in the full training dataset (GOLD STAN-
DARD), 449/478 overlap with toxic. For
identity-hate, overlap with toxic is
1302/1405. Therefore, in this paper, we use the
term toxic more generally, subsuming threat
and identity-hateas particular types of toxic
speech. To confirm that this was a reasonable
choice, we manually examined the 29 threat
datapoints not overlapping with toxic. All of
these represent genuine threats, and are hence
toxic in the general sense.
B The “Identity hate” class
GOLD STD. SEED TEST
Minority 1,405 75 712
Majority 158,166 7,910 63,266
Table 10: Corpus size for identity-hate (minor-
ity) and non-identity-hate (majority).
GOLD STANDARD
Char Word CNN BERT
Precision 0.64 0.54 0.70 0.55
Recall 0.40 0.31 0.20 0.62
F1 (macro) 0.74 0.69 0.65 0.79
Table 11: Classifier performance on GOLD STANDARD.
Precision and recall for identity-hate; F1-score
macro-averaged from both classes.
To see if our results generalize beyond threat,
we experimented on the identity-hate class
in Kaggle’s toxic comment classification dataset.
Again, we take a 5% stratified sample of GOLD
STANDARD as SEED. We first show the number
of samples in GOLD STANDARD, SEED and TEST
in Table 10. There are approximately 3 times more
minority-class samples in identity-hate than
in threat. Next, we show classifier performance
on GOLD STANDARD/identity-hate in Ta-
ble 11. Results closely resemble those on GOLD
STANDARD/threat in Table 4 (§4.2).
We compared SEED and COPY with the tech-
niques that had the highest performance on
threat: ADD, BPEMB, GPT-2, and their com-
bination ABG. Table 12 shows the results.
Like in threat, BERT performed the poor-
est on SEED, with the lowest recall (0.06). All
techniques decreased precision from SEED, and
all increased recall except COPY with CNN. With
COPY, the F1-score increased with Char-LR (0.12)
and BERT (0.21), but not Word-LR (0.01) or
CNN (−0.04). This is in line with corresponding
results from threat (§4.2; Table 6): COPY did
not help either of the word-based classifiers (Word-
LR, CNN) but helped the character- and subword-
based classifiers (Char-LR, BERT).
Of the individual augmentation techniques,
ADD increased the F1-score the most with Char-
LR (0.15) and BERT (0.20); and GPT-2 increased
it the most with Word-LR (0.07) and CNN (0.07).
Here again we see the similarity between the two
word-based classifiers, and the two that take inputs
below the word-level. Like in threat, COPY and
ADD achieved close F1-scores with BERT, but with
different relations between precision and recall.
BPEMB was not the best technique with any clas-
sifier, but increased F1-score everywhere except in
CNN, where precision dropped drastically.
In the combined ABG technique, Word-
LR and CNN reached their highest F1-score in-
creases (0.08 and 0.07, respectively). With Char-
LR F1-score was also among the highest, but does
not reach ADD. ABG again increased recall and
precision above GPT-2, which was at the highest
level among all augmentation methods.
Overall, our results on identity-hate
closely resemble those we received in threat,
resulting in more than 20 percentage point in-
creases in the F1-score for BERT on augmentations
with COPY and ADD. Like in threat, the im-
pact of most augmentations was greater on Char-
LR than on Word-LR or CNN. Despite their similar
F1-scores in SEED, Char-LR exhibited much higher
precision, which decreased but remained generally
higher than with other classifiers. Combined with
an increase in recall to similar or higher levels than
with other classifiers, Char-LR reached BERT-level
performance with proper data augmentation.
Augmentation Metric Char-LR Word-LR CNN BERT
SEED
No Oversampling
Precision 0.85 ± 0.04 0.59 ± 0.05 0.52 ± 0.08 0.65 ± 0.46
Recall 0.11 ± 0.04 0.12 ± 0.03 0.11 ± 0.04 0.06 ± 0.10
F1 (macro) 0.60 ± 0.03 0.60 ± 0.02 0.59 ± 0.02 0.54 ± 0.08
COPY
Simple Oversampling
Precision 0.61 ± 0.02 0.54 ± 0.04 0.27 ± 0.06 0.52 ± 0.06
Recall 0.34 ± 0.04 0.14 ± 0.03 0.07 ± 0.01 0.50 ± 0.06
F1 (macro) 0.72 ± 0.02 0.61 ± 0.02 0.55 ± 0.01 0.75 ± 0.01
ADD
Add Majority-class Sentence
Precision 0.54 ± 0.04 0.54 ± 0.05 0.43 ± 0.05 0.43 ± 0.05
Recall 0.47 ± 0.05 0.21 ± 0.03 0.21 ± 0.04 0.58 ± 0.08
F1 (macro) 0.75 ± 0.01 0.65 ± 0.01 0.64 ± 0.02 0.74 ± 0.01
BPEMB
Subword Substitutions
Precision 0.43 ± 0.04 0.30 ± 0.03 0.15 ± 0.05 0.29 ± 0.06
Recall 0.38 ± 0.04 0.29 ± 0.01 0.32 ± 0.05 0.23 ± 0.03
F1 (macro) 0.70 ± 0.01 0.64 ± 0.01 0.59 ± 0.02 0.62 ± 0.02
GPT-2
Conditional Generation
Precision 0.41 ± 0.05 0.30 ± 0.03 0.33 ± 0.08 0.22 ± 0.05
Recall 0.34 ± 0.04 0.39 ± 0.03 0.34 ± 0.09 0.59 ± 0.06
F1 (macro) 0.68 ± 0.01 0.67 ± 0.01 0.66 ± 0.01 0.65 ± 0.02
ABG
ADD,BPEMB,GPT-2 Mix
Precision 0.41 ± 0.04 0.32 ± 0.03 0.28 ± 0.06 0.27 ± 0.05
Recall 0.50 ± 0.04 0.41 ± 0.02 0.46 ± 0.05 0.62 ± 0.07
F1 (macro) 0.72 ± 0.01 0.68 ± 0.01 0.66 ± 0.02 0.68 ± 0.02
Table 12: Comparison of augmentation techniques for 20x augmentation on SEED/identity-hate: Means for
precision, recall and macro-averaged F1-score shown with standard deviations (10 repetitions).
C Augmentation computation
performance
Table 13 reports computational resources required
for replicating augmentations reported in this pa-
per. GPU computations are performed on a
GeForce RTX 2080 Ti. CPU computations were
performed with an Intel Core i9-9900K CPU @
3.60GHz with 8 cores, where applicable. Memory
usage is collected using nvidia-smi and htop rou-
tines. Usage is rounded to nearest 100 MiB. Com-
putation time includes time to load library from
file and is rounded to nearest integer. Computation
time (training and prediction) shown separately for
GPT-2.
We provide library versions in Table 14. We use
sklearn.metrics.precision recall fscore support7
for calculating minority-class precision, recall
and macro-averaged F1-score. For the first
two, we apply pos label=1, and set average =
’macro’ for the third. For ROC-AUC, we use
sklearn.metrics.roc auc score8 with default pa-
rameters. For t-tests, we use scipy.stats.ttest rel9,
which gives p-values for two-tailed significance
tests. We divide the p-values by half for the
7
https://scikit-learn.org/stable/modules/generated/sklearn.metrics.roc_auc_score.html
8https://scikit-learn.org/stable/modules/generated/sklearn.metrics.roc_auc_score.html
9
https://docs.scipy.org/doc/scipy/reference/generated/scipy.stats.ttest_rel.html
Augmentation
Memory (MiB) Runtime (s)
GPU CPU GPU CPU
COPY - - - < 1
EDA - 100 - 1
ADD - - - 1
WORDNET - 4000 - 1
PPDB - 2900 - 3
GLOVE - 600 - 32
BPEMB - 100 - < 1
GPT-2 3600 3600 12 + 78 -
Table 13: Computational resources (MiB and seconds)
required for augmenting 25 examples to 500 exam-
ples. GPT-2 takes approximately 6 seconds to train per
epoch, and 3 seconds to generate 20 new documents.
one-tailed significance test that we conduct in this
paper.
D Classifier training and testing
performance
Table 15 specifies the system resources train-
ing and prediction require on our setup (Sec-
tion C). The seed dataset has 8,955 documents
and test dataset 63,978 documents. We used the
12-layer, 768-hidden, 12-heads, 110M para ete
Library Version
https://github.com/
Nov 8, 201910
jasonwei20/eda nlp
apex 0.1
bpemb 0.3.0
fast-bert 1.6.5
gensim 3.8.1
nltk 3.4.5
numpy 1.17.2
pywsd 1.2.4
scikit-learn 0.21.3
scipy 1.4.1
spacy 2.2.4
torch 1.4.0
transformers 2.8.0
Table 14: Library versions required for replicating this
study. Date supplied if no version applicable.
BERT-Base, Uncased-model11 .
Training
Memory (MB) Runtime (s)
GPU CPU GPU CPU
Char-LR - 100 - 4
Word-LR - 100 - 3
CNN 400 400 - 13
BERT 3800 1500 757 -
Prediction
Memory (MB) Runtime (s)
GPU CPU GPU CPU
Char-LR - 100 - 25
Word-LR - 100 - 5
CNN 400 400 - 42
BERT 4600 4200 464 -
Table 15: Computational resources (MB and seconds)
required for training classifiers on seed dataset and test
dataset. Note that BERT results here were calculated
with mixed precision arithmetic (currently supported
by Nvidia Turing architecture). We measured memory
usage close to 13 GB in the general case.
E Lemma inflection in WORDNET
Lemmas appear as uninflected lemmas WordNet.
To mitigate this limitation, we used a dictionary-
based method for mapping lemmas to surface man-
ifestations with particular NLTK part-of-speech
(POS) tags. For deriving the dictionary, we
11
https://storage.googleapis.com/bert_models/2018_10_18/uncased_L-12_H-768_A-12.zip
used 8.5 million short sentences (≤ 20 words)
from the following open-source corpora: Stan-
ford NMT (Luong et al., 2015),12 OpenSubtitles
(2018 release) (Lison and Tiedemann, 2016),13
Tatoeba,14 SNLI (Bowman et al., 2015),15 SICK
(Marelli et al., 2014),16 Aristo-mini (December
2016 release),17 and WordNet example sentences
(Miller, 1995).18
The rationale for the corpus was to have a large
vocabulary along with relatively simple grammat-
ical structures, to maximize both coverage and
the correctness of POS-tagging. We mapped each
lemma-POS-pair to its most common inflected
form in the corpus. When performing synonym
replacement in WORDNET augmentation, we lem-
matized and POS-tagged the original word with
NLTK, chose a random synonym for it, and then
inflected the synonym with the original POS-tag if
it was present in the inflection dictionary. As sup-
plementary material, we provide the code for pro-
ducing an inflection dictionary from a text corpus
(make inflections.py).
F GPT-2 parameters
Table 16 shows the hyperparameters we used
for fine-tuning our GPT-2 models, and for gen-
erating outputs. Our fine-tuning follows the
transformers examples with default parame-
ters.19
For generation, we trimmed input to be at most
100 characters long, further cutting off the input
at the last full word or punctuation to ensure gen-
erated documents start with full words. Our gen-
eration script follows transformers examples.
20
In §4.3 – §4.5, we generated novel docu-
ments with a GPT-2 that had been fine-tuned on
threat documents in SEED for 2 epochs. In
Table 17, we show the impact of changing the
number of fine-tuning epochs for GPT-2. Preci-
sion generally increased as the number of epochs
was increased. However, recall simultaneously de-
creased.
12
https://nlp.stanford.edu/projects/nmt/
13
http://opus.nlpl.eu/OpenSubtitles2018.php
14https://tatoeba.org
15
https://nlp.stanford.edu/projects/snli/
16
http://clic.cimec.unitn.it/composes/sick.html
17
https://www.kaggle.com/allenai/aristo-mini-corpus
18
http://www.nltk.org/_modules/nltk/corpus/reader/wordnet.html
19https://github.com/huggingface/transformers/blob/master/examples/language-modeling/run_language_modeling.py
20
https://github.com/huggingface/transformers/blob/818463ee8eaf3a1cd5ddc2623789cbd7bb517d02/examples/run_generation.py
Fine-tuning
Batch size 1
Learning rate 2e-5
Epochs 2
Generation
Input cutoff 100 characters
Temperature 1.0
Top-p 0.9
Repetition penalty 1
Output cutoff 100 subwords or
EOS generated
Table 16: GPT-2 parameters.
G Ablation study
In §4.3 – §4.5 we investigated several word re-
placement techniques with a fixed change rate.
In those experiments, we allowed 25% of pos-
sible replacements. This choice was motivated
byWei and Zou’s (2019) recommendation for data
augmentation for small datasets. Here we study
each augmentation technique’s sensitivity to the re-
placement rate. As done in previous experiments,
we ensured that at least one augmentation is al-
ways performed. Experiments are shown in ta-
bles 18–21.
We first discuss observations with BERT, and
discuss other classifiers next. Interestingly, all
word replacements decreased classification perfor-
mance with BERT. We suspect this occurred be-
cause of the pre-trained weights in BERT.
We show threat precision, recall and macro-
averaged F1-scores for PPDB in Table 18. Chang-
ing the substitution rate had very little impact to
the performance on any classifier. This indicates
that there were very few n-gram candidates that
could be replaced. We show results on WORDNET
in Table 19. As exemplified for substitution rate
25% in H, PPDB and WORDNET substitutions re-
placed very few words. Both results were close to
COPY (§4.3; Table 6).
We show results for GLOVE in Table 20. Word-
LR performed better with higher substitution rates
(increased recall). Interestingly, Char-LR per-
formance (particularly precision) dropped with
GLOVE compared to using COPY. For CNN,
smaller substitution rates seem preferable, since
precision decreased quickly as the number of sub-
stitutions increased.
BPEMB results in Table 21 are consistent across
the classifiers Char-LR, Word-LR and CNN. Substitu-
tions in the range 12%–37% increased recall over
COPY. However, precision dropped at different
points, depending on the classifier. We find that
CNN precision dropped earlier than on other classi-
fiers, already at 25% change rate.
H Augmented threat examples
We provide examples of augmented documents in
Table 22. We picked a one-sentence document
as the seed. The seed document corresponds to
row 5044 in augmented documents ”20200311.txt”
(supplementary material). We remark that aug-
mented documents created by GPT-2 have the
highest novelty, but may not always be considered
threat (see example GPT-2 #1. in Table 22).
Classifier Metric
Fine-tuning epochs on GPT-2
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Char-LR
Precision 0.38 0.43 0.45 0.49 0.51 0.49 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.51
Recall 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.28
F1 (macro) 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68
Word-LR
Precision 0.30 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.34
Recall 0.47 0.45 0.43 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.35
F1 (macro) 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
CNN
Precision 0.26 0.28 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.32
Recall 0.49 0.50 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.47 0.46
F1 (macro) 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68
BERT
Precision 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.17
Recall 0.62 0.66 0.67 0.64 0.65 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.61
F1 (macro) 0.59 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.62
Table 17: Impact of changing number of fine-tuning epochs on GPT-2-augmented datasets. Mean results for 10
repetitions. Highest numbers highlighted in bold.
Metric
PPDB: N-gram substitution rate
0 12 25 37 50 100
Char-LR
Pre. 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14
Rec. 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.05
F1 ma. 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.54
Word-LR
Pre. 0.32 0.33 0.38 0.44 0.41 0.34
Rec. 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01
F1 ma. 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.51
CNN
Pre. 0.44 0.41 0.39 0.36 0.38 0.32
Rec. 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.05
F1 ma. 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.54
BERT
Pre. 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.48
Rec. 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.25
F1 ma. 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.66
Table 18: Impact of changing the proportion of substi-
tuted words on PPDB-augmented datasets. Mean re-
sults for 10 repetitions. Classifier’s highest numbers
highlighted in bold.
Metric
WORDNET: Word substitution rate
0 12 25 37 50 100
Char-LR
Pre. 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.10
Rec. 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.07
F1 ma. 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.54
Word-LR
Pre. 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.34 0.31
Rec. 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02
F1 ma. 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.52
CNN
Pre. 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.45 0.44 0.32
Rec. 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.07
F1 ma. 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.59 0.58 0.55
BERT
Pre. 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.35
Rec. 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.26 0.24 0.18
F1 ma. 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.61
Table 19: Impact of changing the proportion of substi-
tuted words on WORDNET-augmented datasets. Mean
results for 10 repetitions. Classifier’s highest numbers
highlighted in bold.
Metric
GLOVE: Word substitution rate
0 12 25 37 50 100
Char-LR
Pre. 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.32
Rec. 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.05
F1 ma. 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.54
Word-LR
Pre. 0.31 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.33 0.30
Rec. 0.07 0.10 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.09
F1 ma. 0.55 0.58 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.57
CNN
Pre. 0.41 0.44 0.39 0.35 0.28 0.15
Rec. 0.13 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.17 0.06
F1 ma. 0.59 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.60 0.54
BERT
Pre. 0.44 0.43 0.40 0.36 0.33 0.13
Rec. 0.35 0.27 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.03
F1 ma. 0.69 0.66 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.52
Table 20: Impact of changing the proportion of sub-
stituted words on GLOVE-augmented datasets. Mean
results for 10 repetitions. Classifier’s highest numbers
highlighted in bold.
Metric
BPEMB: Subword substitution rate
0 12 25 37 50 100
Char-LR
Pre. 0.65 0.64 0.56 0.52 0.49 0.37
Rec. 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.17 0.06
F1 ma. 0.63 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.63 0.55
Word-LR
Pre. 0.26 0.34 0.31 0.30 0.25 0.19
Rec. 0.07 0.13 0.22 0.25 0.23 0.13
F1 ma. 0.55 0.59 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.57
CNN
Pre. 0.42 0.37 0.22 0.14 0.09 0.03
Rec. 0.17 0.31 0.38 0.31 0.27 0.10
F1 ma. 0.62 0.66 0.63 0.59 0.56 0.52
BERT
Pre. 0.43 0.41 0.33 0.32 0.25 0.08
Rec. 0.37 0.22 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.03
F1 ma. 0.70 0.64 0.60 0.59 0.57 0.52
Table 21: Impact of changing the proportion of substi-
tuted subwords on BPEMB-augmented datasets. Mean
results for 10 repetitions. Classifier’s highest numbers
highlighted in bold.
# Document sample
SEED: No Oversampling
0. if you do not stop, the wikapidea nijas will come to your house and kill you
COPY: Simple Oversampling
1. if you do not stop, the wikapidea nijas will come to your house and kill you
2. if you do not stop, the wikapidea nijas will come to your house and kill you
3. if you do not stop, the wikapidea nijas will come to your house and kill you
EDA: Easy Data Augmentation (Wei and Zou, 2019)
1. if you do put up not stop the wikapidea nijas will come to your house and kill you
2. if you do not stopover the wikapidea nijas will come to your house and kill you
3. if you do not break the wikapidea nijas will come to your house and kill you
ADD: Add Majority-class Sentence
1. We thank you both for your contributions to Wikipedia at-large and your use of the tool. if you
do not stop, the wikapidea nijas will come to your house and kill you
2. if you do not stop, the wikapidea nijas will come to your house and kill you Honest! ))
3. *** username, I am on a shared IP address. if you do not stop, the wikapidea nijas will come
to your house and kill you
PPDB Phrase Substitutions
1. if you do not be halted , the wikapidea nijas will come to your home and kill you
2. if you do not stop , the wikapidea nijas comes along to your house and been murdered you
3. if you do not stop , the wikapidea nijas will arrive to your home and kill you
WORDNET Word Substitutions
1. if you do not stop , the wikapidea nijas will amount to your house and kill you
2. if you do not stop , the wikapidea nijas will come to your house and down you
3. if you do not stop , the wikapidea nijas will come to your theatre and kill you
GLOVE Word Substitutions
1. if you so not stop , the wikapidea nijas will come to yours house have kill you
2. mean know do not stop ? the wikapidea nijas will cos to your house and kill you
3. if you do not thinking , and wikapidea nijas will come to your going and kill you
BPEMB Subword Substitutions
1. whether you know not stop, theldikapideina niji give come to your house and kill you
2. shouldnever do not stop, the wikamyla nijag will come to your house and kill want
3. if you let not train, the wkanapidei nijas will come tonever house and dead you
GPT-2 Conditional Generation
1. for what you have done, you don’t have a choice. You are too big and weak to stop.
2. ! So if you don’t stop this, you will be murdered and your people will be ripped apart. I hope
you die and die and die. No, you will die and die and die. Just stop and kill yourself for it.
Advertisements
3. . You will be hanged like a rat. The next day I will get a letter telling you that you were
kicked out of your home by the wikapidea nijas and that you will die there. You are an idiot
for calling the wikapidea nijas to death and you should die.
ABG: Mixed Augmentation (ADD, BPEMB & GPT-2)
1. Support - The other article is minor, and not worth a separate entry. if you do not stop, the
wikapidea nijas will come to your house and kill you
2. . You will be hanged like a rat. The next day I will get a letter telling you that you were
kicked out of your home by the wikapidea nijas and that you will die there. You are an idiot
for calling the wikapidea nijas to death and you should die.
3. if you let not train, the wkanapidei nijas will come tonever house and dead you
Table 22: Documents generated by selected augmentation techniques in this study. Changes to original seed
highlighted. The selected sample is shorter than average (see §3.1;Table 1). We anonymized the username in ADD
(#3.). Three samples generated by each technique shown.
